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The provision of subsidies by governments is a
widespread practice. Recent years saw a steady rise in
the provision of subsidies by OECD countries.'^
Subsidies in Billion US-Dollars^
Country 1995 1996 1997
OECD-Total 317.02 392.54 485.86
EC 15 193.87 204.99 202.82
U.S.A. 34.0 33.5 32.9
Governments provide subsidies for a variety of reasons
and they are an important tool "to promote important
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is
comprised of industrialized countries, all of which are Members of
the OECD Convention, which entered into force on September 30, 1961.
See OECD, Annual Report 1997 (1998). The following countries are
currently members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States. The Commission of the European Communities
takes part in the work of the OECD.
objectives of national policy."^ Among those objectives
are
:
"(a) the elimination of industrial, economic and social
disadvantages of specific regions,
(b) to facilitate the restructuring, under socially
acceptable conditions, of certain sectors,
especially where this has become necessary by
reason of changes in trade and economic policies,
including international agreements resulting in
lower barriers to trade,
(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage
re-training and change in employment,
(d) to encourage research and development programmes,
especially in the field of high-technology
industries,
(e) the implementation of economic programmes and
policies to promote the economic and social
development of developing countries,
(f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid
congestion and environmental problems."^
2 OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates 1960-1997, Volume 1, 18-19, 22-23,
36-37 (1999) .
^ Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, April 12, 1979,




The policy behind the fact that subsidies are addressed
in international agreements is that they create a
distortion in international trade and that they "can
quickly and destructively spread from nation to nation."^
They create "a disparity between the actual costs incurred
in producing a particular good and those which must be
borne by the firm undertaking its production."^ But
because the concentrated interests of producers command
greater political support than the diffuse interests of
consumers, national governments find it much easier to
emulate the vices of protection than the virtues of free
trade. This lesson has prompted the international
community to fashion guidelines that distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable national subsidy measures
and to codify those guidelines both in bilateral
treaties and in multilateral agreements.^
Subsidies are in international trade parlance referred
to as domestic' and ^export' subsidies. A "domestic
subsidy is granted to an industry on all of its production
if a product, regardless of whether that production is
^ Gary C. Hufbauer & Joanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in International Trade, 5-6
(1984) .
^ Warren F. Schwarz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of
Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 Mich. L.Rev. 831 (1972).
'' Hufbauer & Shelton, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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exported."^ "An export subsidy, by contrast, is paid to an
industry only on products that are exported.""
This thesis deals in particular with the treatment of
domestic subsidies in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) ^° and the
imposition of countervailing duties to offset them under
Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930^\
John H. Jackson et ai., 1ic-ai Problems z- -n-tip-national Economic Relations:
Cases, Material and Text, 7 57 (3'" ed. 1995)
^ Id. at 758.
^'^ Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organizarion, Annex
lA, Uruguay Round Agreement Act, PL 103-465, sec. 101(d)(2), 108
Stat. 4809, 4815, 'reprinted in John H. Jackson et al., 1995 Docoments
Supplement to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 253 (3*^ ed.
1995) (hereinaf-er SCM Agreement)
.
" Tariff Act of 1930 sec. 701, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (Kes- Supp. 1998)
(hereinafter The Act).
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article or merchandise from such country ..., then upon the
importation of any such article or merchandise into the
United States ... there shall be levied and paid ... and
additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or
grant ...."^^ This general countervailing duty law was
extended in 1922 to cover domestic subsidies. The
Fordney-McCumber Tariff provided "that whenever any
country ... shall pay or bestow ... any bounty or grant upon
the manufacture or production or export of any article or
merchandise manufactured or produced in such country ...,
then upon the importation of any such article or
merchandise into the United States ... there shall be levied
and paid ... an additional duty equal to the net amount of
such bounty or grant ...."''^
The Tariff Act of 1922 was the predecessor of the Tariff
Act of 1930^^ Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 is now
applicable to the imposition of countervailing duties and
^^ Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, sec. 237, 26 Stat. 584 (1890)
[repealed or otherwise superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
sec. 4, 53 Stat. 1 (1939) )
.
^^ Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, sec. 5, 30 Stat. 205 (1897) {repealed or
otherwise superseded by Internal Revenue Code of 1939, sec. 4, 53
Stat. 1 (1939) ) .
^^ Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, sec. 303, 42 Stat. 935 (1922) (repealed
by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, sec. 651(a)(1), 46 Stat. 762
(1930) ) .
^^ Tariff Act of 1930, ch . 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
will be scrutinized in detail in Chapter IV of this
thesis
.
The United States are and have been the country with the
most countervailing measures taken to offset trade
distortions caused by subsidies as the following table
shows
:
Sxunmary of countervailing duty actions, 1997^^
Reporting Initiations Definitive Measures in force





EC 4 1 3
Mexico 10 8
New Zealand 12 2
Peru 10
South Africa 10
United States 6 52
^^ World Trade Organization, Annual Report 1998, 89 (Table V.2) (199^
Venezuela 3
TOTAL 13 3 87
B. GATT: Articles VI, XVI and XXIII
The first time subsidies were addressed in a
multilateral agreement was in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ^\ The basic obligations
concerning subsidies are contained in GATT Article XVI
.
GATT Article XVI : 1 sets out a reporting requirement "if
any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy,
including any form of income or price support, which
operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into,
its territory. "^^ Furthermore, GATT Article XVI states
restraints on export subsidies by requiring the
"contracting parties [to] seek to avoid the use of
subsidies on the export of primary products, "^^ If,
however, a contracting party grants export subsidies on
primary products, its obligation is set out in
^' The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
(hereinafter GATT)
.
" Id. at art. XVI.
^^ Id. at art. XVI : 3 .
9
GATT Article XVI :3, which states that export subsidies on
primary products "shall not be applied in a manner which
results in that contracting party having more than an
equitable share of world export trade in that product. "^°
With respect to subsidies on non-primary products,
GATT Article XVI : 4 requires that "contracting parties
shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any
form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a
primary product which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market. "^^ Thus GATT Articles XIV: 3 and XIV: 4 did
not directly prohibit subsidies but set out the mere
obligation to avoid and cease the use of subsidies.
Domestic subsidies were not addressed directly at all in
GATT Article XVI
.
A reference to domestic subsidies was made in the Report
of the Working Party on "Other Barriers to Trade", adopted
in the 1954-1955 review session, relating to the The
Nullification and Impairment of Benefits
(GATT Article XXIII) . The Report stated that
20 Id.
^^ Id. at art. XVI : 4
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so far as domestic subsidies are concerned, it was
agreed that a contracting party which has negotiated a
concession under Article II may be assumed, for the
purpose of Article XXIII, to have a reasonable
expectation, failing evidence to the contrary, that the
value of the concession will not be nullified or
impaired by the contracting party which granted the
concession by the subsequent introduction or increase of
a domestic subsidy on the product concerned. ^^
That means that although domestic subsidies were not
prohibited under GATT Article XVI, they can constitute an
impairment of benefits accruing to a contracting party.
In a decision concerning subsidies paid to processors and
producers of oilseeds by the European Economic Community
the GATT Dispute Settlement Body (Panel) found
that benefits accruing to the United States under
Article II of the General Agreement in respect of the
zero tariff bindings for oilseeds in the Community
Schedule of Concessions were impaired as result of the
introduction of production subsidy schemes which operate
to protect Community producers of oilseeds completely
from the movement of prices of imports and thereby
prevent the tariff concessions from having any impact on
the competitive relationship between domestic and
imported oilseeds. ^"^
22 Review Reports, Report by the Working Party on "Other Barriers to
Trade", March 3, 1955, GATT B.I.S.D. (3'^'' Supp.) at 222, 224 (1955).
^^ Decisions and Reports, Report by the Panel on "European Economic
Community - Payments and Subsidies paid to Processors and Producers
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The panel rejected the argument that since
"[GATT] Articles 111:8 (b) XVI : 1 explicitly recognize the
right of contracting parties to grant production
subsidies,""'' there can be no impairment. On the other
hand, the panel agreed with a former decision concerning
subsidies on ammonium sulphate stating that
nothing in [GATT] Article XXXIII ... would empower the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to require a contracting party to
withdraw or reduce a consumption subsidy .... The
ultimate power of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under [GATT]
Article XXIII is that of authorizing an affected
contracting party to suspend the application of
appropriate obligations or concessions under the General
Agreement . ^^
The GATT therefore provided no direct means to restrict
the use of domestic subsidies. Besides the withdrawal of
concessions under GATT Article XXIII contracting parties
were authorized to respond to the use of (domestic)
subsidies in the form of countervailing duties.
GATT Article VI deals with the imposition of antidumping
and countervailing duties under the GATT,
of Oilseeds and related Animal-Feed Proteins", January 25, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. (37'^'' Supp.) at 86, 132 (1991).
^^ Id. at 128.
^^ Report of Working Parties, Report by the Panel on "The Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate", April 3, 1950, GATT B.I.S.D. (Vol. 2]
at 188, 195 (1952) .
12
GATT Article VIM defines "countervailing duty" as "a
special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any
bounty or subsidy bestowed, either directly or indirectly,
upon the manufacture, production or export of any
merchandise," and limits the amount of any countervailing
duty imposed by a contracting party to "an amount equal to
the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been
granted. "^^
GATT Article VI: 6 (a) establishes that a contracting
party may not impose countervailing duties on imports of
another contracting party unless it determines that the
subsidization "is such as to cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such to
retard materially the establishment of a domestic
industry. "^^ However, because GATT Article VI was subject
to grandfather rights, this injury test did not apply to
the United States countervailing duty law because it
predated the adoption of the GATT and did not contain the
requirement of an injury test.
^^ GATT, supra note 17 at art. VI : 4
^^ Id. at art. VI:6(a) .
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C. Tokyo Round Negotiations: The Svibsidies Code
These flaws of the original GATT were tried to be
eliminated by the negotiation of the Subsidies Code in the
Tokyo Round negotiations from 1974 through 1979. The
Tokyo Round negotiations were aimed, "inter alia, to ...
reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where this is
not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade
restricting or distorting effects, and to bring such
measures under more effective international
discipline, .... "^^
^^The objective of the United States in the negotiations
was to strengthen the rules of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) governing subsidy practices . "^^
The Report of the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade
Act of 1974^° set the goal:
In the long run. United States interests will be best
served by an international agreement to eliminate
subsidies which distort world trade patterns and
discriminate against United States sales both at home
and abroad. Central to the forthcoming multilateral
^^ Decisions, Ministerial Meeting, September 1973, Declaration of
Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, GATT B.I.S.D. (20''*'
Supp. ) at 19, 20 (1974)
.
^^ Richard R. Rivers & John D. Greenwald, The Negotiations of Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures : Bridging Fundamental Policy
Differences, 11 Law & Pol' y in Int'l Bus. 1447, 1448 (1979).
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negotiations should be the establishment of acceptable
international rules governing the use of subsidies . "^^
Most of the other participants negotiations, however,
saw the use of subsidies expressly designed to stimulate
exports as strictly a question of national internal
policy. According to this viewpoint, only when a
country's trade or production was injured by a
particular subsidy practice did that country have a
legitimate ground to raise a concern. Thus, far from
needing stronger rules on subsidies, the problem, as
most MTN participants saw it, was to have the United
States accept discipline, in the form of a material
injury test, over its countervailing duty action. ^^
The Tokyo Round negotiations led to a compromise between
the United States and other participants concerning
application of an injury test by the United States and the
recognition by the other participants that domestic
subsidies can have injurious effects and that
countervailing measures should be allowed against them.
The Subsidies Code sets up a two-track approach to
disciplining subsidies. Track I deals entirely with
countervailing duties, establishing international rules on
what national government can do in implementing their
countervailing duty rules (including constraints on the
^° Trade Act of 1974, Publ . L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975;
^^ S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974).
^^ Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 2 9, at 1449.
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procedures for those cases) and defining what constitutes
a material injury. Track II of the Subsidies Code is
devoted to the substantive obligations under international
law regarding how governments should refrain from granting
subsidies that affect goods in international trade.
In Track I the Subsidies Code recognizes a Signatory's
right to impose countervailing duties on subsidized
imports that cause injury to its domestic producers.
Article 2:1 of the Subsidies Code sets out that
" [c] ountervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to
investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with
the provisions of this Article. An investigation to
determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged
subsidy shall normally be initiated upon a written request
by or on behalf on an industry af fected. "'^'^
In Track II the Subsidies Code sets out the obligations
of the Signatories concerning the use of subsidies.
Article 9:1 of the Subsidies Code states that
" [s] ignatories shall not grant export subsidies other than
certain primary products."'^'' That goes beyond
GATT Article XVI: 4, which sets out the mere obligation to
^^ SCM Agreement, supra note 10 at art. 2:1
^^ Id. at art. 9:1.
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cease the grant of subsidies if they meet the bi-level
pricing condition.
In Article 10:1 of the Subsidies Code the Signatories
agreed "not to grant directly or indirectly any export
subsidy which results in the signatory granting such
subsidy having more than an equitable share of world
export in such product, ...."
The retention of differential treatment for primary and
non-primary products was due to large subsidies in the
agricultural sector that were a central part of the
European Communities Common Agricultural Policy^^. In
further negotiations subsidies on agricultural products
were treated with separately.
Rules governing the use of export subsidies and the
imposition of countervailing measures were not the sole
focus of the Subsidies Code. The Signatories recognized
in Article 11:1 of the Subsidies Code "that subsidies
other than export subsidies are widely used as important
instruments for the promotion of social and economic
policy objectives and do not intend to restrict the right
of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and
other important policy objectives which they consider
^^ See Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 2 9 at 14 4!
17
desirable . "^^ At the same time, however, the Signatories
recognized, "that subsidies other than export subsidies ...
may cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic
industry of another signatory .... Signatories shall
therefore seek to avoid causing such effects through the
use of subsidies . "^^
Thus the Subsidies Code did not accomplish an agreement
on the disciplining of domestic subsidies. Furthermore,
the Subsidies Code did not contain a definition of a
subsidy, which led to confusion in imposing countervailing
measures, which may be levied only to offset subsidies.
In the United States, the Court of International Trade
(CIT) established the specificity test to determine when a
government aid amounted to a subsidy'^^, but the Subsidies
Code provided no direct guidelines in this respect. The
Subsidies Code contained an illustrative list of export
subsidies in its annex indeed, but this list was not
exhaustive and gave only a hint when governmental aid is
specific enough to be subsidy:
- "Signatories recognize that the objectives mentioned
in paragraph 1 above [of Article 11 of the Subsidies
^^ SCM Agreement, supra note 10 at art. 11:1
^^ Id. at art. 11:2.
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Code] may be achieved, inter alia, by means of
subsidies granted with the aim of giving an advantage
of certain enterprises . "''°
"The provision by governments of direct subsidies to
a firm or an industry contingent upon export
performance . "^^
^® See Carlisle Tire and Rubber Company v. United States, 5 C.I.T. 229
(1983)
.
40 SCM Agreement, supra note 10 at art. 11:3,
^^ Id. at Annex (a) .
III. The Uruguay Round: The Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
Although the Subsidies Code was an important step toward
disabling nations from frustrating tariff concessions
through the use of non-tariff measures it still did not
contain a direct prohibition on domestic subsidies and,
more important a definition of a subsidy. After
completion of the Tokyo Round, the new Subsidies Code was
subject to review and interpretation by the GATT Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures Committee. The weaknesses of
the Subsidies Code were presented in a Note prepared by
the Secretariat for the subsidies negotiating group in the
Uruguay Round:
Divergent views have been expressed regarding the
question as to whether a financial contribution by a
government should be one of the criteria for determining
the existence of a countervailable subsidy ....
Conflicting views have been put forward on the question
whether a necessary condition for the existence of a
countervailable (domestic) subsidy is that the practice
in question confers a net benefit to the recipient and
19
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adversely affects the conditions of normal competition
The fundamental problem which has prevented the
signatories from reaching agreement on the methodology
to calculate the amount of a subsidy is the divergence
of views on the question whether the measure of the
amount of the subsidy is the cost to the government
providing that subsidy or the benefit of the recipient
of that subsidy.''^
These particular deficits concerning subsidies and much
more importantly the weakness of the GATT's dispute
settlement authority led in November 1985 to the
establishment of a Preparatory Committee "to determine the
objectives, subject matter, modalities for and
participation in the multilateral trade negotiations ...."^^
This round of negotiations, termed the Uruguay Round, was
launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986.
The major achievement of the Uruguay Round was the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization^'^,
which contained in its Annex the Agreement on Subsidies
^" Problems in the Area of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note
by the Secretariat, GATT Doc. No. MTN. GNG/NGlO/W/3 (March 17, 1987).
^^ Decision of 28 November 1985 on Establishment of the Preparatory
Committee, GATT B.I.S.D. (32"'' Supp.) at 10 (1986).
'''' Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and related Agreements, April 15, 1994, Uruguay Round Agreement Act,
PL 103-465, sec. 101(d)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, reprinted in John H
.
Jackson et al., 1995 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations, 3 (3"'^ ed. 1995) .
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and Countervailing Measures''^. Unlike the 1979 Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code, which only 24 countries joined, all
countries that become members of the WTO automatically
become members of the SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement
addresses two separate but closely related topics:
Multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of
subsidies, and the use of countervailing measures to
offset injury caused by subsidized imports. Multilateral
disciplines are the rules regarding whether or not a
subsidy may be provided by a Member. They are enforced
through invocation of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. Countervailing duties are an unilateral
instrument, which may be applied by a Member after an
investigation by that Member and a determination that the
criteria set forth in the SCM Agreement are satisfied.
A. Definition of a sxibsidy
Unlike the Subsidies Code, the SCM Agreement contains a
definition of the term subsidy. Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement requires two elements: (1) a "financial
^^ See SCM Agreement, supra note 10
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contribution by a government or any public body"''^ within
that government's territory and (2) the conferral of a
"benefit"^\
Four categories of practices that constitute a financial
contribution are specified in Article 1.1(a) (1) of the SCM
Agreement: (1) "a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants,
loans, and equity infusions ) "^^ or "potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan
guarantees)"''^; (2) "government revenue otherwise due that
is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such
as tax credits) "^°; (3) government provision of goods and
services other than general infrastructure^^. The fourth
category is directed against the circumvention of the
rules. Article 1.1(a) (1) (iv) of the SCM Agreement makes
clear that a financial contribution can exist where,
rather than acting directly, "a government makes payments
to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions
[described] above, which normally would' be vested in the
"^ Id. at art. 1.1(a) (1'
"^ Id. at art. 1.1 (a) (1) (i) .
'' Id.
^° Id. at art. 1.1(a) (1) (11) .
^^ See Id. at art. 1 . 1 (a) ( 1 ) (iii) .
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government, and the practice, in no real sense, differs
from practices normally followed by governments."
Thus, the SCM Agreement solved the dispute over the
concept of 'financial contribution' by adopting the
approach that there could be no subsidy unless there was a
charge on the public account. Other forms of government
intervention that do not involve expense to the government
do not constitute a subsidy. The other point of
controversy, whether the existence of a benefit should be
assessed with reference to a commercial benchmark
(benefit-to-the-recipient methodology) or with reference
to the cost to the subsidizing government (cost-to-the-
government standard) was not solved in favour of one of
the approaches. The cost-to-the-government standard is
used to calculate the amount of subsidies regarding the
threshold of an actionable subsidy, whereas the benefit-
to-the-recipient standard is used to calculate the amount
of subsidies in countervailing duty proceedings.
^^ Id. at art. 1.1(a) (1) (iv) .
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B. Specificity
After the Uruguay Round, for the first time specificity
was made a requirement under the GATT . Assuming that a
measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement, it nevertheless is not subject to the SCM
Agreement unless it has been specifically provided to an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
industries. The basic principle is that a subsidy that
distorts the allocation of resources within an economy
should be subject to discipline. Where a subsidy is
widely available within an economy, such a distortion in
the allocation of resources is presumed not to occur.
Thus, only ^specific' subsidies are subject to SCM
Agreement disciplines.
Article 2.1 of the SCM Agreement sets out de jure and de
facto grounds to determine the specificity of a subsidy.
Article 2.1(a) of the SCM Agreement provides that a
subsidy shall be specific "[w]here the granting authority
... explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain
enterprises."^"^ That means on the other hand, as
Article 2.1(b) of the SCM Agreement lays down, that
" Id. at art. 2.1 (al
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"[w]here the granting authority ... establishes objective
criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and
the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist ...."^''
Article 2.1(c) of the SCM Agreement provides that
notwithstanding the absence of de jure grounds for a
finding of specificity, where there are reasons to believe
that the subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors
may be considered. They are: (1) the ''use of a subsidy
program by a limited number of certain enterprises"^^
(industry specificity); (2) the "predominant use by
certain enterprises"^^ (enterprise-specificity); (3) "the
granting of disproportionately large amounts to certain
enterprises"^^; and (4) "the manner in which discretion
has been exercised by the granting authority in the
decision to grant a subsidy. "^^
Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement provides that
prohibited subsidies according to Article 2 of the SCM
Agreement are automatically deemed to be specif ic.^^
Recognizing the federal structure of some Signatories,
^'' Id. at art. 2.1(b) .






^^ See id. at art. 2.3,
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Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement provides that central
government subsidies limited to a region are specific,
even if generally available throughout the region. *'° That
means on the other hand that subsidies granted by a state
or province on a generally available basis within a state
or province (i.e., not limited to certain enterprises
within a state or province) are not specific.
The purpose of the specificity test is to function as an
initial screening mechanism to winnow out only those
foreign subsidies with truly are broadly available and
widely used throughout an economy. The application of the
specificity test in United States countervailing duty law
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this thesis.
C. Classes of Subsidies
Articles 3 to 9 of the SCM Agreement establish a three-
class framework for the categorization of subsidies and
subsidy remedies: (1) subsidies that are prohibited (the
'red light' category); (2) subsidies that may be
challenged in WTO dispute settlement proceedings and
domestically countervailed if they cause adverse trade
^° See id. at art. 2.2
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effects (the 'yellow light' category, including 'dark
amber'); and (3) subsidies that are non-actionable and
non-countervailable if they are structured according to
criteria intended to limit their potential for causing
trade distortions (the 'green light' category)
.
The 'traffic light' framework was adopted from a Swiss
suggestion at a meeting of the negotiating group in
February 1988.^'^ Switzerland proposed to "redefine
existing categories and to introduce three different
classes of subsidies: prohibited subsidies, actionable
subsidies and non-actionable subsidies . "^^
1. Prohibited ('Red Light') Subsidies
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement lists two categories of
subsidies that are prohibited under all circumstances.
The first is "subsidies contingent, in law or in fact,
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
export performance ..."^^ (export subsidies) . A detailed
" See Meeting of 1-3 February 1988, Note by the Secretariat, GATT Doc,
Nr. MTN.GNG/NGlO/6 (Feb. 15, 1988).
^^ Communication from Switzerland, GATT Doc. No. MTN . GNG/NGlO/W/17
(Feb. 1, 1988) , at 1-2.
63 SCM Agreement, supra note 10 at art. 3.1 (a;
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list of export subsidies is annexed to the SCM Agreement
The second is "subsidies contingent, whether solely or as
one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic
over imported goods"^^ (local content subsidies). These
two categories of subsidies are prohibited because they
are designed to affect trade and thus are most likely to
have adverse effects on the interests of other members.
The scope of these prohibitions is relatively narrow.
Developed countries had already accepted the prohibition
on export subsidies under the Subsidies Code, and the
local content subsidies of the type prohibited by the SCM
Agreement were inconsistent with the National Treatment
Clause in GATT Article 111:1, which provided that "[t]he
products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use."^^ What is most
significant about the SCM Agreement concerning export
*^ See id. at Annex 1.
" Id. at art. 3.1 (b)
.
" GATT, supra note 17 at art. 111:4
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subsidies is the extension of the obligations to
developing country Members in accordance with specified
transition rules, as well as the creation in Article 4 of
the SCM Agreement of a rapid (three-month) dispute
settlement mechanism for complaints regarding prohibited
subsidies. ^^ All that must be established is the existence
of a prohibited subsidy. If a panel or the Appellate Body
finds that a government is maintaining a prohibited
subsidy, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO must
authorize countermeasures if the subsidy is not withdrawn
expeditiously
.
2. Actionable ('Yellow Light' and 'Dark Amber')
Subsidies
Most subsidies, such as production subsidies fall into
the 'actionable' category. Actionable subsidies are not
prohibited. However, they are subject to challenge,
either through multilateral dispute settlement or through
countervailing action, in the event that they cause
adverse effects to the interests of another Member.
^~' See SCM Agreement, supra note 10 at art. 4.
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Article 5 of the SCM Agreement sets out three types of
adverse effects:
"(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member;
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
directly or indirectly to other [WTO] Members ...;
"
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another
Member. "^^
Unlike the Subsidies Code, Article 6 of the SCM
Agreement defines the term ^serious prejudice'. A major
improvement to the Subsidies Code is that ^serious
prejudice' cannot only arise as a result of adverse
effects in the market of the importing Member but also in
a third country market. Article 6.3(b) of the SCM
Agreement provides that "[sjerious prejudice ... may arise
in any case where ... the effect of the subsidy is to
displace or impede the exports of a like product in
another Member from a third country market. "^^
The SCM Agreement refers to two kinds of actionable
subsidies against which action can be taken in the WTO or
in domestic countervailing duty proceedings if adverse
effects are established by an effected Member. The first
type are those dealt with by the SCM Agreement as
^^ Id. at art. 6.
^^ Id. at art. 6.3 (b) .
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prohibited or non-actionable subsidies and for which, in
the case of a serious prejudice, non-exhaustive examples
are provided in Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement. The
second type (termed Mark amber' subsidies), listed in
Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, are presumed to cause
serious prejudice. Where serious prejudice is presumed.
Article 6.2 of the SCM Agreement places the burden on the
subsidizing government to demonstrate that serious
prejudice did not result from the subsidization in
question. The four Mark amber' subsidies are:
"(a) the total ad valorem subsidization of a product
exceeding 5 per cent;
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an
industry;
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an
enterprise, other than one-time measures which are
non-recurrent and cannot by repeated for that
enterprise and which are given merely to provide
time for the development of long-term solutions and
to avoid acute social problems;
(d) direct forgiveness of debt ...."^°
^° Id. at art. 6.1
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Annex IV of the SCM Agreement sets forth general rules
governing how a complaining member is to calculate the
total ad valorem subsidization of a product for purposes
of showing whether the 5 per cent threshold of Article
6.1(a) of the SCM Agreement has been reached. The most
fundamental of the general rules set forth in Annex IV is
the broad statement in Paragraph 1 that the ad valorem
calculation must be based on the cost-to-the-government
measurement standard. Annex IV Paragraph 1 of the SCM
Agreement provides that "[a]ny calculation of the amount
of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a) of Article
6 shall be done in terms of the cost to the granting
government . "^"^
That causes a number of problems since the cost-to-the-
government standard is not further explained in the SCM
Agreement in contrary to Article 14 of the SCM, which
endorses the benefit-to-the-recipient standard for use in
countervailing duty proceedings. Further questions are
whether the overall rate of subsidization should be
calculated separately for each benefiting company or
whether the overall rate of subsidization must be
calculated as an aggregate for all benefiting companies.
Id. at Annex IV, § 1.
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The other problem is whether Red Light subsidies should be
included in the calculation of the overall rate of
subsidization
.
Remedies against actionable subsidies are laid out in
Article 7 of the SCM Agreement. Once a Member requests
consultations regarding such a subsidy, the SCM Agreement
allots 180 days for completion of the panel proceedings
and the issuance of a decision by the Dispute Settlement
Body. The SCM Agreement provides an additional 60 days
for appeals of panel findings. The Dispute Settlement
Body must authorize countermeasures where a Member has not
either withdrawn a subsidy found to be causing serious
prejudice or eliminated its adverse effects within six
months
.
3. Non-Actionable ( ^ Green Light') Siibsidies
The SCM Agreement accords non-actionable, or ^Green
Light', status to three narrow types of subsidies. That
means those subsidies cannot be challenged multilaterally
or be subject to countervailing action. These subsidies
presumably are protected either because they are
considered extremely unlikely to cause adverse effects or
34
because they are considered to be of particular value and
not to be discouraged. Article 8 of the SCM Agreement
provides for three types of non-actionable subsidies:
(a) basic research and pre-competitive development
subsidies ; ^^
(b) assistance to disadvantaged regions;"^"^
(c) assistance to adapt existing facilities to new
environmental requirements. "^
Under Article 8.2(a) of the SCM Agreement, government
assistance for research activities conducted by firms, or
by higher education or research establishments on a
contract basis with firms, is non-actionable if the
assistance does not exceed a designated proportion of
project costs and is only used for certain expenditures.
Under Article 8.2(b) of the SCM Agreement, government
assistance to disadvantaged regions is non-actionable if
it is not limited to specific enterprises or industries
within the region, given pursuant to a general scheme of
regional development, and the region is disadvantaged by
comparison with the Member as a whole in terms of
^' See id. at art. 8.2(a)
^^ See id. at art. 8.2 (b)
'"^ See id. at art. 8.2(c)
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objective criteria such as GNP per capita and
unemployment
.
Under Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement, government
assistance for environmental adaptation is considered
permissible if it is given on a one-time basis, limited to
20 per cent of adaptation cosrs, and available to all
firms which can adopt the new equipment and processes.
D. Rules regarding countervailing duty proceedings
Articles 10 through 23 (Part V) of the SCM Agreement
establish rules for domestic countervailing duty
proceedings. Part V of the SCM Agreement sets forth
certain substantive requiremenrs zhaz rr.usi: be fulfilled m
order to impose a countervailing measure, as well as in-
depth procedural requirements regarding the conduct of a
countervailing investigation and the im.position ana
maintenance in place of countervailing measures. A
failure to respect either the substantive or procedural
requirements of Part V can be taken to dispute settlement
and may be the basis for invalidation of the measure.
A Member may not impose a countervailing measure unless
it determines that there are subsidized imports, injury to
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a domestic industry and a causal link between the
subsidized imports and the injury.
As laid out in Chapter III.B of this thesis, a subsidy
is countervailable only if it is specific. This thesis
focuses in Chapter IV on this first step of a
countervailing measure procedure, in particular how the
specificity test is implemented in U.S. domestic
countervailing duty law.
Part V of the SCM Agreement furthermore contains
detailed rules regarding the initiation and conduct of
countervailing investigations, the imposition of
preliminary and final measures, the use of undertakings,
and the duration of measures.
IV. U.S. Legislation
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act implemented the SCM
Agreement into U.S. countervailing duty law. ^ The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act did not alter the procedure that had
been imposed by The Trade Agreements Act of 1979.''^
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 imposed a two-step test
that must be satisfied before a countervailing duty can be
used against a Member. The first step requires that the
Commerce Department determines whether a subsidy even
exists. Then, if there is a subsidy, the International
Trade Commission (ITC)^^ must determine whether there has
been a material injury to an U.S. industry. "^^
Chapter IV of this thesis focuses on the first step of
this test, the determination of the existence of a
subsidy.
''^ Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
'^^ The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). This law
was passed in response to the Tokyo Round of the GATT.
''''
See The Act sec. 702, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671a (West Supp. 1998).
'^^ Hereinafter ITC.




Section 771(5) (A) of the Act provides the basic
definition of the terms ^subsidy' and ^countervailable
subsidy' . The systematic of the provision is to provide a
definition of a subsidy according to Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement in section 771(5) (B) of The Act and to
restrict in section 771 (5A) of the Act the admissibility
of countervailing measures to subsidies that are specific
according to Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.
With respect to the term subsidy, section 771(5) (B) of
the Act tracks the language of Article 1 of the SCM
Agreement. It provides that a subsidy exists where "a
government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of the country"^°
"(i) provides a financial contribution,
(ii) provides any form of income or price support
within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT
1994, or
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide
a financial contribution, or entrusts or directs
a private entity to make a financial
contribution, of providing the contribution
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would normally be vested in the government and
the practice does not differ in substance from
practices normally followed by governments, ...,"®^
The definition of a financial contribution is to be
found in Section 771(5) (D) of The Act, which tracks the
language of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. A problematic
issue in determining whether a subsidy exists is whether
Article 1.1(a) (1) (iv) of the SCM Agreement and Section
771(5) (B) (iii) of the Act encompass indirect subsidy
practices
.
Those practices can vary widely but one practice
appeared frequently in the past, which does not seem to
fall in one of the prongs of the definition. These cases
involved export restraints that artificially raised the
domestic supply of a certain good.
In Leather from Argentina , the Department of Commerce
issued a Countervailing Duty Order to offset subsidies
that were conferred to manufacturers, producers, or
exporters in Argentina of leather.^" In 1972, the
Government of Argentina implemented an embargo on the
export of cattle hides. The Department of Commerce found
^° The Act sec. 771(5(B), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (B) (West Supp. 1998).
" Id.
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that prices for cattle hides in Argentina were
considerable lower when the embargo was in f orce , ^"^ The
lower price for cattle hide in Argentina benefited
domestic producers of leather but was not directly caused
by the embargo but by the higher supply. The Department
of Commerce determined that the Argentina cattle hide
embargo is countervailable nonetheless, because there was
"a cognizable and discernible link between the Argentina
hide embargo" and the low domestic price for cattle hide.^''
The rationale underlying that determination was that the
export embargo "caused hide prices to be lower than they
would have been absent the embargo" and, thereby, enabled
the leather tanners to sell the finished product, leather,
at a lower price. ^^
The Mirect and discernible effect' standard was
reapplied in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada. ^^ This case involved the practice of Log Export
Restrictions (LERs)^'' used by the Government of British
^^ See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Countervailing Duty Order; Leather from Argentina, 55 Fed. Reg.
40,212 (1990).
" Id. at 40,213.
^^ Id. at 40,214.
^^ Id. at 40,213.
^^ Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22570 (1992).
^^ Hereinafter LER.
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Columbia/^ The issue in Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada was the same as in Leather from Argentina
since the government of British Columbia did not maintain
direct control over the log prices though the imposition
of its export restrictions. But the Department of
Commerce found also in this case that the indirect scheme
had the effect of reducing the production costs of British
Columbia softwood lumber manufacturers. Therefore the
LERs had "a direct and discernible effect upon the British
The Lumber Case dragged on for over twelve years. This controversy
originally arose as a result of a Canadian 'stumpage pricing'
policy, under which timber on government-owned lands is sold to
private Canadian companies that pay a ^stumpage price' for the right
to harvest it. In 1983, in response to a petition from a coalition
of U.S. lumber producers, the Commerce Department found these
practices not to be countervailable (Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed.
Reg. 24159 (1983)). When the coalition petitioned again in 1986,
the Commerce Department reversed its previous findings and held in a
preliminary determination that the stumpage system was a
countervailable subsidy (Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51
Fed. Reg. 37453-02 (1986)). Canada responded quickly with an offer
of implementing a 15% export tax on all lumber in exchange for an
agreement not to impose a countervailing duty. The Commerce
Department agreed and declared that the preliminary finding was
without effect, and the deal was finalized in a Memorandum of
Understanding (See Memorandum, Determination under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 233 (1986) . In 1991, Canada
terminated the Agreement and the Department of Commerce initiated a
countervailing duty investigation (Self-Initiation of Countervailing
Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
56 Fed. Reg. 56055 (1991)). Included in the investigation was a new
complaint about the practice of LERs in British Columbia. In 1992,
the Commerce Department issued a final determination and imposed a
countervailing duty based on both the stumpage practices and the LER
System (Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra note
86) . The Commerce Department found that the stumpage system did
benefit specific producers with preferential rates. It also found
that the LERs are subsidies within the meaning of Section 771(5) (A)
of The Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (A) (1991) (current version at 19
U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (A) (West Supp. 1998)).
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Columbia domestic price of logs and, thereby, confer a
benefit upon British Columbia softwood lumber
manufacturers ...."^
The ^cognizable and discernable effect' standard is
supported in legal respect by GATT Article VI : 3
.
GATT Article VI : 3 refers to subsidies that "have been
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture,
production or export of ... [a] product. "^° That means that
the words "entrusts or directs a private party"^'^ in
Article 1.1 (iv) of the SCM Agreement have to be
interpreted broadly to cover governmental actions that
have indirect effects through a private body.
In practical respect the standard is supported by the
necessity to prevent the circumvention of the SCM
Agreement. The standard is a reasonable means to
determine whether a measure has a direct effect on the
price of the input product, in the foregoing cases raw
hides and unprocessed lumber, even though the effect upon
the processed product, leather and processed lumber, is
indirect. The requirement of the existence of a
Miscernable link' between the measure and the result
®^ Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra note 86, at
22610.
'° GATT, supra note 17, at art. VI : 3
.
'^ SCM Agreement, supra note 10, at art. l.l(iv).
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secures that only those measures are countervailable that
constitute a financial contribution within the meaning of
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
B. Specificity
Section 771 (5A) of The Act implements the provision of
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement dealing with specificity.
The specificity requirement ensures that programs
conferring a broad, generalized benefit are not
countervailable. For example, roads and schools for
public use or tax credits available to all companies
confer a generalized benefit and are thus not
countervailable. On the other hand, programs that favor
one or more market participants and are capable of
distorting the relative allocation of resources to
different sectors a country's economy, or are
potentially trade distorting, are specific benefits. ^^
Three policy goals underlie the specificity test.
First, the test supposedly serves as a practical
limit on the number of possible claims United States
industries can bring against subsidies in foreign
countries. Such a practical limit ... is needed because
all industries in every country receive some direct or
indirect government benefits. ...
92 John A. Ragosta & Howard M. Schanker, Specificity of a Subsidy in
U.S. Department of Commerce Countervailing Duty Determinations, 25
Law & Pol'y Int' l Bus. 639, 641 (1994) (Internal citations omitted).
44
Second, some scholars maintain that the specificity
test minimizes the distortive effects of countervailing
duties by separating subsidies which distort economic
efficiency form those that do not. The economic theory
of comparative advantage suggests that gains from
international trade are maximized when countries export
goods that they can produce relatively more efficiently
than producers in other countries and import goods that
other countries can produce more efficiently. A
specific subsidy supposedly misallocates resources away
from a country' s efficient industries into its
inefficient ones, thereby raising prices for importers
of the affected products. ...
Finally, the specificity test is based on notions of
fairness regarding the appropriate role for government
in the economy. United States producers generally
consider it unfair to have to compete against foreign
rivals run or propped by their governments when at home
United States producers must follow the ^survival of the
most efficient' rule of free competition.^"^
Although the specificity requirement was added to an
international agreement only in 1994 with the adoption of
the SCM Agreement after the Uruguay Round, U.S.
countervailing duty law contained a specificity test since
1979. The Trade Agreement Act of 1979^^ added a
specificity test into Section 771 of The Act, which was in
^^ James D. Southwick, The Lingering Problem with the Specificity Test
in United States Countervailing Duty Law, 72 Minn. L.Rev. 1159, 1173
(1988) .
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force until 1994, when it was changed by the Uruguay
Rounds Agreements Act"*''. The old Section 771(B) of The Act
read: ''In applying subparagraph (A) [which defines the
term subsidy], the administering authority {The Department
of Commerce], shall determine whether the bounty, grant,
or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries. Nominal general availability, under the terms
of the law, regulation or program, or rule establishing a
bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is
not a basis for determining that the bounty, grant, or
subsidy is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof."'*'
Based on the statutory definition of a domestic subsidy,
the Department of Commerce and the United States Court of
International Trade^^ (CIT) developed a specificity test to
determine whether a government program constitutes a
domestic subsidy. The specificity test states that only a
government program conferring benefits on specific
^^ See The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra not 76.
^ See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 75.
^' The Act sec. 771(5) (B), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (B) (1990) (current
version 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677 (5A) (West Supp . 1998)).
" Hereinafter CIT.
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enterprises or industries is a domestic subsidy /^^ Thus, a
government program generally available to many or all
producers in the country is not a domestic subsidy giving
rise to countervailing duties. These of court decisions
still serve as guidelines in the interpretation of the new
Section 771 (5A) of the Act, which replaced Section
771 (5) (B) of the Act.
In Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, which
was decided in 1983, the CIT found the specificity test to
a reasonable interpretation of the statute.'"" In this case
the Department of Commerce had determined that a generally
available Korean tax law permitting accelerated
depreciation that benefited a particular Korean
manufacturer was not a bounty or grant. "^°° The CIT noted
that application of a broad definition of bounty or grant
would lead to the "absurd result" that almost all imports
could be countervailed, a result that would create an
overwhelming administrative burden and make impossible the
Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, supra note 39
(upholding Department of Commerce's determination that a government
program was not a subsidy within the meaning of countervailing duty
law unless conferring a benefit upon a specific enterprise or
industry); Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 489 (1985)
(holding that a government program is not countervailable unless it
bestows a benefit on a specific class of industries), appeal
dismissed, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986); PPG Industries v. United
States, 11 C.I.T. 344 (1987) (same holding).
^' See Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, supra note 39.
^°° Id. at 230, 231.
— ^ —
qfCTezmr-^" ~ •~s*
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The first case to consider directly the validity of the
specificity test was Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United
States. ^^^ In this case, the South African government
permitted companies to deduct 200 percent of their
employee training program expenses from their income, a
benefit the Department of Commerce held not to be a bounty
or grand based on its general availability . "^'^'^ The CIT
upheld the specificity test in regard to tax provisions,
but, in dicta, the CIT rejected the rationale "that, as a
rule, generally available benefits are not subsidies .
"^°''
The CIT asked the rhetorical question whether it can "be
argued that financial assistance that is inconsistent with
commercial considerations it no longer a subsidy when it
is part of the basic policy of a government and available
to all businesses [.] "^'"'*^ In doing so the CIT purported a
case-by-case approach:
In this decision the Court does not feel it is necessary
to speak to a variety of practices which are not before
the Court. It does not see the alternatives as being
either the absurd assessment of countervailing duties on
all beneficial acts of government or the exclusion from
the effect of the law of all benefits which are
^°^ See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 C.I.T. 339 (1984
^°^ See id. at 340.
^°'' Id. at 341.
''' Id. at 345.
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generally available in a country. Both these extremes
have their absurdities. The Court does not enter intro
broad policy formulations based on general economic
tendencies in. the world. In the early phases of the
interpretation of difficult concepts of legislation ... it
j_c: bss" ~c "issc "'""s ^"wiciicial rss'-i_~5 rcc"wLssci en "ine
immediate factual pattern =rising in each particular
case . '"^
Those cases present two divergent approaches tc the
application of 'bounty or grant'.
On the one hand, Bethleher. Steel ... a^a^ve little
~, £N — ^ V- ^-V • - I
administers, finding the countervailing duty lav." t:
of whether they are preferential or not. Cn the i:
it considers a reastnarle ITA mterpretaticn if th{
statute based on legislative histcry, case law and
economic analysis: domestic benefits are cnly
countervailable when they are applied in a prefere:
basis tc a specific economic sector or subsectcr."
Despite this diveraent approaches bcth thecries ha^>




In Cabot Corp. v. United States the CIT created a two-
part test: first, whether a benefit actually accrues to a
specific industrial beneficiary; second, whether the
benefit confers a benefit, i.e., a 'competitive
advantage' ."^^"^ This case arose out of Mexico's National
Industrial Development Plan, which, utilizing incentives
such as tax rebates, low interest loans and favorable
energy rates, set investment priorities among industrial
activities and geographic regions.^" The government of
Mexico made carbon black feedstock available to its
producers at well below world market prices; although the
world market cost of petroleum feedstock was USD 26 per
barrel, the Mexican government made petroleum feedstock
available to Mexican producers at USD 2 per barrel . '^'^"^
Through the application of the specificity test, the
Department of Commerce did not consider the Mexican
natural resource subsidies to be countervailable . "^'' The
CIT overturned the Department of Commerce's decision and
^^° Michael J. Sussmann, Countervailing Duties and the Specificity
Test: An Alternative Approach to the Definition of 'Bounty or
Grant', 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 475, 4 94 (1986).
"^ See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T. 489 (1985).
"^ See id. at 490.
^" See id.
"^ See id. at 490, 491, 495.
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found that this aspect of the Mexican National Industrial
Development Plan constituted a subsidy.
^^^
The CIT found that the Department of Commerce had
applied an incorrect legal standard, holding that when a
government program, nominally available to all industries,
only works to confer a benefit on specific enterprises or
industries, the program meets the test for a
countervailable subsidy . "'•"'•^ Thus the CIT distinguished
between nominally and actually generally available
subsidies
:
The distinction that has evaded the ITA is not all so-
called generally available benefits are alike - some are
benefits accruing generally to all citizens, while
others are benefits that when actually conferred accrue
to specific individuals or classes. Thus, while it is
true that a generalized benefit provided by government,
such as national defense, education or infrastructure,
is not a countervailable bounty or grant or grant, a
generally available benefit - one that may be obtained
by any and all enterprises or industries - may
nevertheless accrue to specific recipients. General
benefits are not conferred upon any specific individuals
or classes, while generally available benefits, when
actually bestowed, may constitute specific grants
^^- See id. at 491.
^^'^ See id. at 498.
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conferred upon specific identifiable entities, which
would be subject to countervailing duties.
^^''
The CIT then went on in developing the two-part test:
[The first inquiry is] whether a benefit or 'competitive
advantage' has been actually conferred on a 'specific
enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries.' In the case before the Court, the
availability of carbon black feedstock and natural gas
at controlled prices does not determine whether the
benefits actually received by these two carbon black
producers are countervailable subsidies. ... Once it has
been determined that there has been a bestowal upon a
specific class, the second aspect of the definition of
bounty or grant requires looking at the bestowal and
determining if it amounts to an additional benefit or
competitive advantage . "^"^^
Thus, the two-part test is an inquiry into the issue
whether an available benefit has an actual effect on the
beneficiary. Thereby the CIT added to the specificity
test the element of de-facto specificity.
This approach was reaffirmed in PPG Industries v. United
States. -^-^^ PPG Industries v. United States involved the
Fund for Promotion of Exports of Mexican Manufactured
Products. The ITA determined that the Mexican
^^' Id. at 497
^^^ Id. at 498
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government's sale of natural gas to Mexican float glass
producers at below world market prices did not amount to a
countervailable subsidy because the natural gas was
generally available to all Mexican industries /^° The CIT
upheld the Department of Commerce's finding that "the
float glass paid the published price for natural gas that
was available to all industries and therefore received no
countervailable benefit. "^^^ The CIT stated that "the
appropriate standard or test requires the agency to
conduct a de facto case analysis to determine whether or
not a program provides a 'subsidy' or a 'bounty or grant'
to a 'specific enterprise or industry, or group of
enterprises or industries.'"^"" "PPG Industries thus
clarified the Cabot rule to mean that when a government
program is nominally generally available and in fact
widely used, the program is not a countervailable
subsidy."^"
"' See PPG Industries v. United States, 11 C.I.T. 344 (1987).
^^° See Unprocessed Float Glass from Mexico; Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 23097, 23099-100 (1984)
.
^^^ PPG Industries v. United States, supra note 119, at 631.
^^^ Id. at 361, 362.
^^^ James D. Southwick, The lingering Problem with the Specificity Test
in United States Countervailing Duty Law, 72 Minn. L.Rev. 1159, 1172
(1988) .
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Section 771 (5A) (D) of The Tariff Act of 1930
As stated above Section 771 (5A) (D) of The Act replaced
Section 771(B) of the Act and is far more detailed
concerning the specificity of domestic subsidies. The
statute provides definitions of de-jure and de-facto
specificity, with which the standards under which the ITA
conducts countervailing duty investigations have to be
reconciled
.
1. Specific Enterprise or Industry
The specificity test as laid out in Section 771 (5A) (D)
of The Act refers to the access of an industry or
enterprise to a subsidy . '^^'^
Whereas the definition of the term 'enterprise' causes
no difficulties there is no definition of the term
'industry'. As the Department of Commerce stated in
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, "there is a
realm of acceptable definitions of the terms
' industry .' ""^^^ In this case, the Department of Commerce
124 3gg 3g^_ 771(5B(D) of The Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5A)(D) (West
Supp. 1998)
.




explicitly rejected the contention that product based
descriptions were applicable, or even helpful, in defining
the applicable industry or group. '^^^ Similarly, in Certain
Fresh Cut Flowers from the Netherlands , the Department of
Commerce explicitly rejected the argument that benefits
provided to the horticulture and greenhouse industries
were too broad to be considered specific because they were
provided to more than sixty different categories of
products . ^^'^ The Department of Commerce thereby tends to
apply a common sense definition of industry based upon
practical experience and common usage.
Since the Department of Commerce is elusive in providing
a concrete definition of what constitutes an industry, a
more specific definition should be formulated. A
definition could consider such criteria as common
products, common unions, and common input.
De-jure Specificity
Sections 771 (5A) (D) (i) and (ii) of The Act cover de
Id. at 22584, 22585,
Final Affirmative Cc
Cut Flowers from the Netherlands, 52 Fed. Reg. 3301, 3312 (1987
^^"' ountervailing Duty Determination: Certain Fresh
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jure-specif icity and track the language of Articles 2,1 (a)
and (b) of the SCM Agreement.
Clause (i) provides that specificity exists where a
government expressly limits eligibility for a subsidy to
an enterprise or industry.'^
Clause (ii) is a corollary of the de jure test. Under
clause (ii), a subsidy would not be deemed to be de jure
specific merely it was bestowed pursuant to certain
eligibility criteria. However, the eligibility criteria
or conditions must be objective, clearly documented,
capable of verification, and strictly followed. In
addition, eligibility for the subsidy must be automatic
where the criteria are satisfied. Finally, the objective
must be neutral and must not favor certain enterprises or
industries over others. '''^^
De jure specificity addresses legal, textual
restrictions on the availability of a subsidy benefit. A
clear-cut example of a de jure specific subsidy can be
found in Live Swine from Canada .'^^^ This case involved
benefits to hog producers under the British Columbia Farm
^^^ See The Act sec. 771(5A) (D) (i), (ii), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5A) (D) (i).





Administrative Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 50560 (1991)
.
^2' ec. 771(5A) (D) (ii), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5A) (D) (ii) (West
^^° Swine from Canada; Final Results of Countervailing Duty,
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Income Insurance Act . '^^^ The Farm Income Insurance Act of
1973 listed in its Schedule B guidelines all products,
whose producers are eligible to receive benefits under
this program. ^^^ The Department of Commerce found the
program specific since "the program is limited to a
specific group of enterprises or industries, and,
therefore, is countervailable, because it is only
available to farmers producing commodities under Schedule
B guidelines of the Farm Income Insurance Act of 1973. '^^'^
Questionable is whether de jure specificity exists only
where the statute expressly specifies the benefiting
industry or enterprise as a recipient of the subsidy or
whether it is sufficient that one can establish the
beneficiaries by analyzing the statute. The Department of
Commerce applied in Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada the second interpretation . "^'^'^ Although the statute
did not explicitly set forth the beneficiaries of the
program, the Department of Commerce found that the LER'
s
"on their face, benefit only [British Columbia] users of
logs ... Accordingly, the domestic benefits conferred by
^^^ See id. at 50563.
^^^ See id.
1" Id
134 See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, supra 86 note at
22610.
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these export restraints are de jure limited to a specific
group of industries . "^^^ This question is only academic
though, since one can establish de facto specificity by
furnishing evidence that a statute in fact benefits only
one specific enterprise or industry.
De jure specificity does not exist, however, where a
program merely restricts the access to certain benefits.
The CIT found in PPG Industries v. United States the
Mexican Trust Fund for Coverage of Risks (FICORCA) since
sector neutral and objective factors formed the basis of
criteria for eligibility, and if eligibility is automatic
once these factors are met, then the program is not de
jure specific even though eligibility may be limited on
its face."'"'^^ FICORCA was a trust fund set up by the
Mexican government, which provided Mexican firms with
registered debt in foreign currency an payable abroad with
foreign currency at a controlled rate."'"'^'^ The CIT hold
that "the mere fact that a program contains certain
eligibility requirements for participation does not
transform the program into one which has provided a
countervailable benefit. The test necessarily involves
135 Id.
^^^ See PPG Industries v. United States, supra note 119, at 353
"^ See id. at 350.
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subjective case by case decisions to determine whether
there is a discrete class of beneficiaries . "^^^
The concept of de jure specificity as applied by the
Department of Commerce and adjudicated by the CIT provided
the basis for the SCM regulation in Article 2.1(a) and (b)
and its interpretation has therefore not to be changed to
comply with the SCM Agreement.
3 . De facto Specificity
Section 771(5A)D) (iii) of The Act lists the factors to
be examined with respect to de facto specificity. These
factors, tracking the language in Article 2.1(c) of the
SCM Agreement, are:
"(I) The actual recipients of the subsidy, whether
considered on an enterprise or industry basis, are
limited in number.
(II) An enterprise or industry is a predominant user of
the subsidy.
(III) An enterprise of industry receives a
disproportionately large amount of the subsidy.
"^ See id. at 353,
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(IV) The manner in which the authority providing the
subsidy has exercised discretion in the decision
to grant the subsidy indicates that an enterprise
or industry is favored over others . "^'^^
De facto specificity addresses the usage of a program'
s
benefits by a specific enterprise or industry even if
statutory and regulatory eligibility requirements are
neutral and objective on their face, or if the benefits of
a program are nominally available to the entire economy.
The concept of de facto specificity has been developed
by a number of CIT decisions from Carlisle Tire and. Rubber
Co. to PPG Industries and focuses on the de facto access
to the benefits of a program by a specific enterprise or
industry. But there has been no definition at what point
an enterprise or industry becomes the specific beneficiary
of a subsidy. A de facto specificity test does make only
little sense when it finds generally available a program
that provides ninety-nine per cent of its benefit to a
specific industry, even if the remaining one percent
benefits dozens of industries. If the total number of
beneficiaries is too broad, the relevant question then
becomes how dominant or disproportionate is the specific




industry's use of the program's benefits. The SCM
Agreement tries to clarify this issue by adding the terms
'dominant use' and 'disproportionate beneficiary' into the
concept of de facto specificity.
a. Dominant Use
The dominant use analysis is based on the share of the
benefit of a program to an enterprise or an industry. No
set guidelines, however, exist for establishing dominant
use .
In Certain Textile Mill Products and Apparel from
Thailand, the Department of Commerce found in its
preliminary determinations that an industry that availed
itself for 45 percent of a program was specific based on
dominant use.'^'^° According to the Department of Commerce
approximately 45 percent of the rediscounts under this
program were provided on the short-term promissory notes
of producers of all products classified as textiles in
Thailand. This percentage indicates that textile
producers receive a disproportionate share of these
rediscountable loans. Therefore, although there does
not appear a de jure limitation within the program
'^° Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain
Textile Mill Products and Apparel from Thailand, 49 Fed. Reg. 49661,
49662 (1984) .
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eligibility criteria, there does appear to be de facto
limitation on the way in which the program operates . ^''^
This case involved the Bank of Thailand' s Regulations
Governing the Rediscount of Promissory Notes Arising from
Industrial Undertakings permitting commercial banks to
rediscount short-term promissory notes for industrial
purchases . ^^^
The use of the term disproportionate' does not have to
be mistaken with the disproportionate beneficiary'
analysis which will be discussed in Chapter IV. 3. b of this
thesis
.
In its determination the Department of Commerce speaks
of an indication and does not use a mathematical formula.
Given the complex nature of this determinations and the
differences in the industry structure of every country, a
case-by-case determination seems to be the most reasonable
approach. Nonetheless, the Department of Commerce should
at least establish a framework for its analysis to provide





If not as a dominant user, an enterprise or industry can
receive a disproportionate benefit under a program. Two
arguments support this theory to deem an enterprise or
industry as specific, although it is not the dominant user
of benefit.
First, an industry may be receiving a disproportionate
benefit, thus distorting the economy, when the share of
its total use of the program' s benefits is far greater
than its contribution to the economy ... Second, one might
argue that an industry receives a disproportionately large
benefit compared with other users of a program. "^^'^
In Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from
Korea, the Department of Commerce used a ration between
the share of loans and industry received and that
industry's share of the economy to determine that the
steel industry was not receiving a disproportionate share
of the medium- and long-term loans. '^''^ This case involved
medium- and long-term loans through government direction
designed to finance major or key industries to Korean
^"^ Ragosta & Shanker, supra note 92 at 668, 669.
^^^ See Final Affirmative Duty Determination; Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel
Flat-Rolled Products from Korea; and Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination; Carbon Steel Structural Shapes from Korea, 4 9
Fed. Reg. 47284, 47289 (1984).
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producers of shapes and sheet, as part of the Korean steel
industry, which were made on terms that were inconsistent
with commercial considerations.'^''^ The Department of
Commerce found that
[n] otwithstanding that certain of the sources have been
created to provide credit to designated groups of
recipients, these groups do not receive a
disproportionate share of the total medium- and long-
term credit available from all sources combined.
Moreover, we determine that the steel industry does not
receive a disproportionate share of funds from all these
sources. Indeed, over the last 15 years, the steel
industry has accounted for approximately 6 to 13 percent
of GNP. During the same period the basic metals sector,
which includes steel, has received 5 to 8 percent of
medium- and long-term loans. ''"''^
In Certain Heavy Iron Construction Castings From Brazil,
the Department of Commerce again compared the ratio of
percentage of GDP to the industry' s share of the benefit
to find that no specificity existed . ^^"' This case involved
the Brazilian Fund for Developing of Mining and Metallurgy
(FDM), which provided through the government-owned
Development Bank of Minas Gerais (BDMG) loans to foundries
^''^ See Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain




on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.'^''^
Here the Department of Commerce found that mining and
metallurgy together contributed over 51 percent to the
Gross Domestic Product of the state, while receiving 33
percent of the credit extended by the BDMG in 1984. There
is no evidence of targeting of these of other BDMG funds
to the industry under investigation. Accordingly, we
determine that loans under the FDM program are not limited
to a specific enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries . ''^^
In the disproportionate beneficiary analysis the
Department of Commerce does not use a set mathematical
formula as well. A pragmatically case-by-case approach
seems to be reasonable here, too, in order to take
different economic situations in different countries into
consideration. But the Department of Commerce should
develop certain standards and framework in its





The SCM Agreement is a big step forward towards the
elimination of subsidies. The SCM Agreement provides,
compared to the GATT and the Subsidies Code, the means to
tackle domestic subsidies, which potentially distort the
allocation of resources in an economy. At the same token,
the SCM Agreement recognizes that a) domestic subsidies
can serve a purpose that justifies the misallocation of
resources and b) specific subsidies rather than general,
cross-industry subsidies should be singled out as
countervailable since they favor certain market
participants and distort the allocation of resources.
By deeming certain domestic subsidies as non-actionable,
the SCM Agreement acknowledges certain policy objectives
that are more important than ideal economic conditions.
Research subsidies further scientific accomplishments in
areas that are economically non-lucrative but benefit the
society. Subsidies for disadvantaged regions equalize
economic disparities in countries with disparate economic
structures. In doing so, this kind of subsidies enhances
66
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the quality of life in disadvantaged regions, which is
viewed as more important than allocating resources in
better suited regions even if this would be economically
more reasonable. Environmental adaptation subsidies, the
third category of non-actionable subsidies, serve the
important goal of furthering environmental protection.
The specificity test serves the purpose of eliminating
subsidies benefiting only particular enterprises or
industries while allowing countries to subsidize the whole
economy to achieve certain policy objectives not covered
by Article 8 of the SCM Agreement to a de-minimis level of
5 percent. Problematic, though, is the lack of a defined
standard underlying the test. This lack has afforded the
Department of Commerce discretion in applying the
countervailing duty statute. This allows the Department
of Commerce to take in consideration the effect and intent
of a particular government benefit. While this might be
helpful in cases where subsidies serve overwhelmingly
important policy objectives it makes countervailing duty
investigations opaque and inconstructable
.
An alternative to the specificity test would be to
abandon the test and lower the de-minimis level. This
would transform countervailing duty determinations to a
mere mathematical analysis and eliminate Department of
68
Commerce's discretion. Although this approach would make
those determinations more predictable, it disregards that
the scrutiny of subsidies only under mathematical aspects
neglects economic and political reality. Subsidies serve
as an important vehicle for the achievement of policy
objectives that have different ranks in different
countries. These objectives can reach a far higher rank
than the goal to maintain ideal economic conditions.
What has to be changed is the application of the
specificity test. A case-by-case approach is reasonable
because it takes the intent and effect of a government
benefit into account. But the Department of Commerce
should establish objective criteria to afford a framework
in the determining the thresholds of the dominant use and
disproportionate beneficiary analysis. This would make
its determinations more understandable and objective and
thus more difficult to target.
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